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FALSE COMMERCIAL SPEECH AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT: UNDERSTANDING THE IMPLICATIONS OF
THE EQUIVALENCY PRINCIPLE
Martin H. Redish* & Kyle Voils**
INTRODUCTION
In the late 1960s, the Phillip Morris Company introduced a cigarette known as
“Virginia Slims.”1 In an effort to give the cigarette a marketing personality, the com-
pany advertised it as a cigarette for women, apparently attempting to tie the brand
to the burgeoning women’s liberation movement.2 Its highly successful slogan was,
“You’ve come a long way, baby.”3 The slogan was designed to get women to realize
how far they had come in terms of independence in what had previously been a man’s
world, and identify that independence with the cigarette made especially for them.4
One can debate the morality of such an advertising campaign, but however one feels
about its merits or demerits, there is no doubt that the campaign’s slogan could easily
be applied to commercial speech itself. Although it took almost seventy years, com-
mercial speech went from being outside the First Amendment looking in to a status
almost equivalent to that of the most protected forms of expression.5
For many years, commercial speech was summarily excluded from any meaning-
ful level of constitutional protection under the First Amendment right of free speech.6
In its 1976 decision in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Con-
sumer Council, Inc.,7 the Court changed all of that by extending a not-insignificant
* Louis and Harriet Ancel Professor of Law and Public Policy, Northwestern Pritzker
School of Law.
** AB University of Tennessee; JD Northwestern School of Law.
1 Ruth Rosen, You’ve Come a Long Way Baby (Or Have You?), HUFFINGTON POST:
BLOG (Feb. 21, 2013, 10:52 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ruth-rosen/womens-move
ment_b_2733469.html [https://perma.cc/ZD2B-VY4U].
2 Cathryn Jakobson, Why They Stretched the Slims, N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 1986), http://
www.nytimes.com/1986/06/08/magazine/why-they-stretched-the-slims.html?pagewanted
=all [https://perma.cc/3NV8-M5UU].
3 Rosen, supra note 1.
4 See Jakobson, supra note 2; Rosen, supra note 1.
5 See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 557 (2011) (holding that “[s]peech in aid
of pharmaceutical marketing” is subject to “heightened judicial scrutiny”); Valentine v.
Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942) (stating that “purely commercial advertising” does not
enjoy the same safeguards as other types of speech).
6 See Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 645 (1951); Valentine, 316 U.S. at 54.
7 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
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level of constitutional protection to commercial speech.8 However, the Court quickly
made clear that commercial speech is “afforded . . . a limited measure of protection,
commensurate with its subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment val-
ues[.]”9 As a result, the Court deemed itself free to uphold regulation of commercial
speech when the regulatory authority established merely that damage “may” occur,10
or that there is a “possibility” of harm resulting from the speech in question.11 This
degree of protection was far less than that given most categories of noncommercial
speech, for which the showing of a “compelling interest” was usually required to
justify suppression.12
The famed four-pronged test from Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v.
Public Service Commission,13 adopted by the Court in 1980, at best appeared to
extend commercial speech a form of intermediate scrutiny protection, still far below
the strict scrutiny/compelling interest protection given more traditionally protected
categories of noncommercial expression.14 The Court purports to continue to apply
that test to this very day.15 Beginning in 1993, however, both the Court’s rhetoric
and decisions began to change.16 Since that year, it is difficult to find a Supreme Court
decision upholding the suppression of truthful commercial speech. As a practical,
if not a formal, matter, then, it could reasonably be said that today, truthful commer-
cial speech receives a level of protection approaching, if not actually reaching, the
level of protection received by noncommercial speech.17 In fact, in recent years the
Court appears to have adopted the principle that, contrary to statements in its de-
cisions during the early years of the commercial speech doctrine, in the broad scheme
of the First Amendment truthful commercial speech is deemed to have value equiva-
lent to that of noncommercial speech.18 To the extent commercial speech can be
suppressed in situations where noncommercial speech would be protected, it must
8 See id. at 762–65.
9 Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978).
10 See id. at 457, 464–68.
11 See Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 13–16 (1979).
12 See Martin H. Redish & Kelsey B. Shust, The Right of Publicity and the First Amendment
in the Modern Age of Commercial Speech, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1443, 1489 (2015).
13 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
14 See id. at 564–66.
15 See, e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 572 (2011).
16 See City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 417 (1993) (holding that
the City’s restriction on commercial speech was not a “reasonable fit” between the govern-
ment’s interest and means).
17 See, e.g., Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 176 (1999)
(holding that a prohibition on broadcasts concerning legal gambling was a violation of the First
Amendment); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 489 (1996) (plurality opinion)
(holding “that Rhode Island’s statutory prohibition against advertisements that provide the pub-
lic with accurate information about retail prices of alcoholic beverages [was] . . . invalid”).
18 See infra Section I.A.3.
2017] FALSE COMMERCIAL SPEECH AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 767
be because of a showing of harm uniquely associated with commercial speech.19 For
purposes of convenience, we refer to this judicial assumption of equivalent value of
commercial and noncommercial speech as the “equivalency principle.” We do not
mean to suggest that the Supreme Court has at this point fully recognized the inex-
orable doctrinal implications of its own equivalency principle.20 But there can be no
doubt that the Court has in fact adopted the principle. Indeed, in its most recent
statements on the issue, the Court has held that governmental regulation providing
noncommercial speakers better treatment than comparably situated commercial
speakers is deserving of strict scrutiny.21
The glaring exception to application of this equivalency principle to determine
the scope of commercial speech protection is false commercial speech, which has
long been categorically excluded from the protective reach of the First Amendment.22
At first blush this categorical exclusion might appear to be understandable. False
commercial speech, of course, serves no value in and of itself; indeed, it is reason-
able to believe that it can only be harmful to society and the individuals who pop-
ulate it, in a variety of ways. But in the abstract, at least, the same could be said of
false noncommercial speech as well: Listeners or readers who base life-affecting
decisions—either political or personal—in reliance on false information or opinion
may suffer great harm. Moreover, false speech may unjustly injure the reputations
of innocent individuals. Yet the Supreme Court has long recognized, at least in the
context of noncommercial speech, that the relevant constitutional analysis is far more
complex than this simplistic analysis might suggest.23 Even though false speech in
and of itself serves no value and often causes harm, occasions will arise in which
false speech must be protected in order to foster broader values and societal needs.24
The question then arises, why has the equivalency principle, which has played
such an important doctrinal role in the recent shaping of modern commercial speech
doctrine, not played an equally important role in the context of the regulation of
false commercial speech? There may well be a satisfactory answer to this question,
19 Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 579; Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. at 426.
20 See, e.g., Redish & Shust, supra note 12 (criticizing preferential protection of traditional
media over commercial advertisers in response to suits for violation of the right of publicity).
21 See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2224 (2015) (holding that Gilbert’s sign
code imposing content-based restrictions on speech was subject to strict scrutiny); Sorrell,
564 U.S. at 557 (holding that “[s]peech in aid of pharmaceutical marketing . . . is a form of
expression protected by the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment” and thus “must be
subjected to heightened judicial scrutiny”).
22 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980)
(holding that for commercial speech to be protected by the First Amendment, it “must . . .
not be misleading”).
23 See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964) (requiring “actual
malice” for a false statement about a public official to fall into a Free Speech exception).
24 See, e.g., id.
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but there can be no doubt that the Supreme Court has failed even to devote sufficient
attention to the question to determine whether such an answer exists.
It is our position that the logic underlying the equivalency principle, which now
appears to play so important a role in the context of First Amendment protection for
truthful commercial speech, applies with equal force to the regulation of false
commercial speech. In other words, to the extent false noncommercial speech is
deemed to have value, if only indirectly, false commercial speech should be seen as
serving the very same values. But it is important to note that this does not mean that
the actual protection extended to false commercial speech needs to be equivalent to
that received by false noncommercial speech in all instances in order to satisfy the
equivalency principle. That principle, it should be recalled, does not require that regu-
lators always provide identical treatment to commercial and noncommercial speech.
Rather, all it demands is that to the extent the two categories of expression are to be
distinguished in the level of First Amendment protection they receive, it must be
because the harm caused by one is uniquely greater than the harm caused by the
other, not because the value of one of the categories of expression is deemed to be
greater than that of the other.25 In short, the equivalency principle demands an assump-
tion of equivalent value, not equivalent consequences or equivalent protection.
When the dust settles, a proper analysis will reveal that the result of application
of the equivalency principle in the context of false commercial speech regulation
will in some important respects differ little, if at all, from the way that false commercial
speech is treated today.26 But that will not be true in all cases as either a doctrinal or
theoretical matter, and in any event the constitutional stakes involved extend well
beyond the principle’s doctrinal implications for the regulation of false commercial
speech. That is because those who oppose the idea that commercial and noncommer-
cial speech are equivalent as a matter of First Amendment value can today simply
point to the significant doctrinal difference in the level of protection received by
false commercial and noncommercial speech as persuasive evidence that the equiva-
lency principle is nothing more than a doctrinal mirage.27 In reality, the argument
proceeds, the Court properly recognizes that commercial speech does not possess
value equivalent to noncommercial speech.
The goal of this Article, then, is twofold. First, it is designed to demonstrate that
the logic of the equivalency principle for commercial speech is as applicable to the
context of false speech as it is to the context of truthful speech.28 Second, it is
designed to demonstrate that to the extent false commercial and noncommercial
speech are in fact to be treated differently in specific contexts, it is not because of
25 See infra Part III.
26 See infra Part III.
27 See infra Sections II.A–II.B.
28 See infra Part II.
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variance in value of the two forms of speech, but rather because of variance in the
nature and degree of harm caused by the two categories of speech.29
In this way, we will have accomplished two goals. We will have shown how and
why First Amendment doctrine needs to be adjusted to take account of the proper ap-
plication of the equivalency principle to false speech, and we will have disposed of the
argument that the different treatment given false commercial speech demonstrates the
invalidity of the equivalency principle when applied to truthful commercial speech.30
The first Part of this Article explores both the doctrinal evolution and theoretical
merits of the equivalency principle.31 It concludes first that Supreme Court doctrine
has evolved to the point where government is no longer permitted to regulate truth-
ful commercial speech in a manner differently from its regulation of noncommercial
speech solely on the grounds that commercial speech is of lesser value to the interests
fostered by the First Amendment.32 To the extent commercial speech may be sub-
jected to more invasive regulation than noncommercial speech, it must be due to
government’s efforts to prevent harms caused uniquely by commercial speech.33 The
Part then concludes that the Court’s current approach is not only fully justified but
actually dictated by a proper understanding of the theory of free expression.34
In the second Part, the Article explores the implications of the equivalency
principle for regulation of false commercial speech.35 On the basis of an analysis of
First Amendment theory, the Article concludes that the equivalency principle logically
applies to false, as well as truthful commercial speech.36 In the case of unknowingly
false commercial speech, we believe the equivalency principle dictates that even in
the face of potentially substantial harm, the speech must be protected. The Court has
reached this conclusion for unknowingly false defamatory speech of public figures,
even though such speech may give rise to serious and unique harm to victims’
reputations.37 There is, we conclude, absolutely no principled basis on which to dis-
tinguish these two situations.38 In the case of knowingly false commercial speech,
however, we conclude that—as is the case for knowingly false defamation of public
figures—the harm is sufficiently severe to justify the loss of constitutional protec-
tion.39 As a doctrinal matter, this would differ from the constitutional treatment given
most knowingly false non-defamatory noncommercial speech.40 But that difference
29 See infra Part III.
30 See infra Sections II.B–II.C.
31 See infra Part I.
32 See infra Section I.A.
33 See infra Section I.A.3.
34 See infra Section I.B.
35 See infra Section I.B.
36 See infra Part II.
37 See infra Section II.B.
38 See infra Section II.C.
39 See infra Part III.
40 See infra Section II.B.
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is justified not by a difference in First Amendment value but rather by a significant
difference in the nature and intensity of the harm caused by the different forms of
knowingly false speech.
Thus, while as a practical matter knowingly false commercial speech would,
under our suggested framework, generally be subject to more pervasive regulation
than knowingly false noncommercial speech, this is not because it possesses lower
First Amendment value than noncommercial speech, but rather because the nature,
intensity, and immediacy of the harm it causes justifies the distinction in First
Amendment protection. Avoidance of the harm constitutes a sufficiently compelling
interest to justify suppression of knowingly false commercial speech while in most
(though not all) cases the harm caused by knowingly false noncommercial speech
does not. However, to the extent that false noncommercial speech does, in fact, give
rise to dangers of harm identical to those caused by false commercial speech, such
speech should be (and, to a certain extent, already is) subject to the same regulatory
regime constitutionally permitted for false commercial speech.41 The difference, in
other words, is based on the nature and severity of the harm, not on the commercial
nature of the expression.
I. COMMERCIAL SPEECH AND THE EVOLUTION OF THE EQUIVALENCY PRINCIPLE
A. The Doctrinal Evolution of the Equivalency Principle
1. Early Protections for Commercial Speech
For many years, commercial speech received no First Amendment protection.
Most famously, the Court in Valentine v. Chrestensen42 stated that “[w]hether, and
to what extent, one may promote or pursue a gainful occupation in the streets, to
what extent such activity shall be adjudged a derogation of the public right of user,
are matters for legislative judgment.”43 Although, the Court held that while the Con-
stitution demands that government restrictions of free speech must not be “unduly
burden[some],” it stated explicitly that “the Constitution imposes no such restraint
on government as respects purely commercial advertising.”44
Things stood this way for more than thirty years. However, in Virginia State Board
of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., the Court dramatically al-
tered the state of First Amendment doctrine, picking up where it left off in Bigelow v.
Virginia.45 While the Court had previously extended protection to an advertisement
41 See infra Part II.
42 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
43 Id. at 54.
44 Id.
45 See generally Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748 (1976); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
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that “did more than simply propose a commercial transaction,”46 the Court in Virginia
Board extended First Amendment protection to pure commercial speech.47 The
Virginia Board Court first expounded on Bigelow, stating that the First Amendment
protects speech even though “money is spent to project it . . . [, and] even though it
is carried in a form that is ‘sold’ for profit.”48 The Court, in holding that commercial
speech is protected by the First Amendment, emphasized the importance of the “free
flow of commercial information” to both individuals and society more generally.49
Because private economic decisions abound in individuals’ lives, there is both a
societal and individual interest in ensuring those decisions are “intelligent and well
informed.”50 Indeed, even if a speaker’s motivation is purely economic, “[t]hat hardly
disqualifies him from protection under the First Amendment.”51 Commercial speech
therefore deserves protection even if it only proposes a transaction.52 While Virginia
Board was the first decision to explicitly extend First Amendment protection to “pure”
commercial speech, it did not extend entirely the same degree of protection to com-
mercial speech as it had to noncommercial speech.53 Instead, the Court pointed to
“commonsense differences” between commercial and noncommercial speech that
might justify greater restriction of the former.54 Most relevantly, the Court regarded
commercial speech’s “greater objectivity and hardiness” as reducing, in comparison to
noncommercial speech, the need to tolerate false or misleading commercial speech.55
The Supreme Court has held that the First Amendment protects some category
of false, noncommercial statements of fact, because such speech is “inevitable in
free debate” and strict punishment of all such speech therefore “runs the risk of
inducing a cautious and restrictive exercise of the constitutionally guaranteed free-
doms of speech and press.”56 In Virginia Board, however, the Court reasoned that
commercial speakers are unlikely to similarly fear inadvertently violating false com-
mercial speech regulations and thus refrain from engaging in commercial speech,
because commercial speech’s greater objectivity allows speakers to “more easily
verif[y]” its accuracy before they speak.57 The Court further reasoned that truthful
46 Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 822.
47 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 762.
48 Id. at 761 (citations omitted).
49 Id. at 764–65 (remarking that some commercial advertisements “may be of general
public interest”).
50 Id. at 765.
51 Id. at 762.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 771–72 n.24.
54 Id.
55 Id.; see, e.g., Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 13, 15–16 (1979) (upholding a law prevent-
ing optometrists from practicing under trade names because “there is a significant possibility
that trade names will be used to mislead the public”).
56 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974).
57 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771–72 n.24.
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commercial speech is hardier, or “more durable,” than noncommercial speech, because
commercial speech is necessarily required in order to make profits.58 Insofar as
speakers are profit driven, then, they are unlikely to be “chilled by proper regulation”
of false commercial speech.59 In sum, the Virginia Board Court, relying on these so-
called differences between commercial and noncommercial speech as justification,60
held that while the First Amendment must in some instances protect false noncom-
mercial speech, under no circumstances does it protect false commercial speech.61
2. Central Hudson and Limited Protections for Commercial Speech
While Virginia Board and its early progeny seemed to suggest only that some
particular features of commercial speech might permit heavier restrictions, the Court’s
decision in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n62 broadly restricted the First Amend-
ment protections for both truthful and false commercial speech.63 According to the
Ohralik Court, Virginia Board acknowledged “the ‘common sense’ distinction” be-
tween commercial and noncommercial speech,64 namely that commercial speech
“occurs in an area traditionally subject to government regulation[.]”65 Ignoring that
distinction and providing equal First Amendment protection to commercial and
noncommercial speech, the Court reasoned, “could invite dilution, simply by a level-
ing process, of the force of the Amendment’s guarantee with respect to the latter
kind of speech.”66 To invite that dilution and “subject the First Amendment to such
a devitalization”67 all for the sake of commercial speech, which the Court stated has
a “subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment values,” would simply be
too risky.68 Accordingly, the Court stated instead that commercial speech has “a
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 See supra notes 54–57 and accompanying text.
61 425 U.S. 771–73. Although Virginia Board was an obvious success for commercial
speech advocates, the Court, in the years immediately following Virginia Board, solidified its
position that false commercial speech could be more heavily restricted than false noncom-
mercial speech. See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 383 (1977) (holding that
“leeway for untruthful or misleading expression that has been allowed in other contexts has
little force in the commercial arena” (citations omitted)).
62 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
63 Id. at 455–56.
64 Id. (quoting Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771 n.24).
65 Id. at 456 (citing Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771 n.24).
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 See id. But see City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 434 n.2
(1993) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (“[T]he ‘limited measure of protection’ our cases had afforded
commercial speech reflected the fact that we had allowed ‘modes of regulation that might be
impermissible in the realm of noncommercial expression’ and not that we had relegated com-
mercial speech to a ‘subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment values.’”).
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limited measure of protection,” thus “allowing modes of regulation that might be
impermissible in the realm of noncommercial expression” but also preserving the
heightened protection for noncommercial speech.69
Ohralik thus continued the Court’s practice of allowing much more pervasive
regulation of commercial speech than of noncommercial speech. The Court’s sub-
sequent decision in Central Hudson enshrined in doctrine a method to ensure that
commercial speech, regardless of falsity, is entitled to noticeably less First Amendment
protection than noncommercial speech.
After reinforcing Ohralik’s justifications for affording commercial speech less
First Amendment protection, the Court in Central Hudson adopted a four-part analy-
sis for determining whether particular government regulations of commercial speech
are unwarranted.70 Such an approach ensures that commercial speech receives First
Amendment protection only in appropriate cases and that, in those cases, commer-
cial speech receives only the appropriate amount of protection against unjustified
speech restrictions.
The first step of Central Hudson’s four-part analysis concerns whether the com-
mercial speech affected by some government regulation is protected by the First
Amendment at all.71 Given the Court’s view that the First Amendment protects com-
mercial speech only because of the “informational function of advertising,” the First
Amendment protects commercial speech only if it “accurately inform[s] the public
about lawful activity.”72 The First Amendment does not protect, and the government
may thus freely suppress, any commercial speech that (1) provides false information
to the public, (2) is “more likely to deceive the public than to inform it,” and (3) con-
cerns unlawful activities.73 While acknowledging that, “[i]n most other contexts, the
First Amendment prohibits” content-based speech regulations such as these, the Court
justified content-based regulation of commercial speech because its greater objectivity
and hardiness protect it from the suffocation of overbroad regulation.74
If, however, the First Amendment applies because the commercial speech in
question is “neither misleading nor related to unlawful activity,”75 the government
must then show that its regulation satisfies the final three parts of the Central Hudson
test,76 which essentially amounts to surviving intermediate scrutiny.77 Central Hudson’s
69 Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 456.
70 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
71 Id.
72 Id. at 563.
73 Id. at 563–64 (citations omitted).
74 Id. at 564 n.6 (citing Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530,
537–40 (1980); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 381 (1977)).
75 Id. at 564.
76 Id. at 566.
77 See id. at 573 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (asserting that, while intermediate scrutiny
might be appropriate for restrictions on false or misleading commercial speech, restrictions
on truthful and lawful commercial speech must survive heightened scrutiny).
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second part requires that the government “assert a substantial interest to be achieved
by restrictions on commercial speech.”78 Third, Central Hudson requires that the
government’s commercial speech regulation “directly advance[s] the state interest,”
thus prohibiting regulations that “provide[ ] only ineffective or remote support for
the government’s purpose.”79 Fourth, and finally, the test requires that commercial
speech regulations are “narrowly drawn” to restrict only as much speech as neces-
sary to advance or protect the state’s interest.80
3. Contemporary Commercial Speech Protection
While Central Hudson has never been overruled, several post–Central Hudson
cases seem to afford commercial speech more protection than the Central Hudson
test originally contemplated. Indeed, it seems that, in almost all facets, the Court now
affords truthful commercial speech virtually as much First Amendment protection
as it does noncommercial speech. The Supreme Court has not upheld governmental
suppression of truthful commercial speech in more than twenty years. For example,
consider City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc.,81 in which Discovery Network
and its publisher challenged the City of Cincinnati’s refusal to allow them to use
newsracks on public property to distribute commercial handbills as a violation of the
First Amendment.82 Because the respondents accepted the city’s interest in safety
and esthetics as substantial and accepted the characterization of their speech as
commercial speech, the Court considered only whether the city met its burden of
showing “a ‘reasonable fit’ between its legitimate interests in safety and esthetics and
its choice of a limited and selective prohibition of newsracks as the means chosen
to serve those interests.”83
The Court held that there was not a reasonable fit between the city’s interests in
preserving esthetics and its decision to selectively ban only those newsracks that con-
tained commercial handbills.84 The Court emphatically rejected the city’s argument
78 Id. at 564. But see Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 74–75 (1983) (citing
Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Twp. of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 95–96 (1977)) (suggesting that some
commercial speech provides information of such great import, e.g., truthful information that aids
parents in giving informed parental guidance, that the restriction of that information “consti-
tutes a ‘basic’ constitutional defect regardless of the strength of the government’s interest”).
79 Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564; see, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 769 (1976) (“The advertising ban does not directly
affect professional standards one way or the other. It affects them only through the reactions
it is assumed people will have to the free flow of drug price information.”).
80 Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 565 (footnote omitted) (quoting In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412,
438 (1978)).
81 507 U.S. 410 (1993).
82 Id. at 412.
83 Id. at 416 (footnote omitted).
84 Id. at 424–28.
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that it could restrict the respondents’ commercial speech but permit all noncommercial
speech to continue using newsracks based only on the assertion that “commercial
speech has only a low value.”85 Indeed, the Court stated that “the city’s argument
attaches more importance to the distinction between commercial and noncommercial
speech than our cases warrant and seriously underestimates the value of commercial
speech.”86 In fact, the discrimination against the respondents’ commercial speech
bore “no relationship whatsoever” to the city’s interest in promoting newsracks, be-
cause “all newsracks, regardless of whether they contain commercial or noncommer-
cial publications, are equally at fault.”87 The Court therefore rejected the city’s “bare
assertion that the ‘low value’ of commercial speech is a sufficient justification for
its selective and categorical ban on newsracks dispensing ‘commercial handbills.’”88
Furthermore, the Court noted that the city’s failure to consider promoting its interest
in esthetics by “regulating the[ ] size, shape, appearance, or number” of newsracks
showed that the city had not considered seriously whether there was a less restrictive
way of advancing that interest.89
Having concluded that the city’s commercial speech restriction did not establish
a reasonable fit, the Court proceeded to consider whether the city’s regulation was
a reasonable “time, place, or manner” restriction that could be “adequately justified
‘without reference to the content of the regulated speech.’”90 Holding otherwise, the
Court noted that “the very basis for the regulation is the difference in content between
ordinary newspapers and commercial speech.”91
The Court’s refusal to allow commercial speech to be restricted merely because
it is of purportedly lower value than noncommercial speech represents an important
insight about the essence of commercial speech protection. The Court has stated that
“an interest in preventing commercial harms . . . [is] the typical reason why commer-
cial speech can be subject to greater governmental regulation than noncommercial
speech.”92 This statement seems to strongly suggest that the Court now affords more
protection to commercial speech than “a limited measure of protection, commensu-
rate with its subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment values[.]”93
Instead, Discovery Network suggests that commercial speech enjoys just as much
protection as any other form of speech, but that its unique harms can sometimes
justify more extensive regulation than would be permissible for noncommercial
85 Id. at 418–19.
86 Id. at 419.
87 Id. at 424, 426.
88 Id. at 428.
89 Id. at 417.
90 Id. at 428 (first quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989); then
quoting Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 228, 293 (1984)).
91 Id. at 429.
92 Id. at 426 (citations omitted).
93 Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978).
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speech.94 That is a long way from the Central Hudson position that all commercial
speech, regardless of context, is afforded less First Amendment protection than non-
commercial speech.95 Indeed, the Court’s willingness to consider, after moving past
the reasonable fit discussion, whether the city’s regulation was “justified as a legitimate
time, place, or manner restriction on protected speech” signals that it was willing to
consider commercial speech as fully protected speech that may sometimes be sub-
jected to more severe restrictions because of its unique harms.96
This view of the Court’s changing attitude is strengthened by the Court’s plurality
in 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island.97 Justice Stevens, writing for a plurality, ex-
plicitly stated that the First Amendment only allows commercial speech to be more
easily restricted by regulations “consistent with the reasons for according constitu-
tional protection to commercial speech.”98 For example, regulations concerned with
preventing false or misleading commercial advertisements, given the greater objec-
tivity and hardiness of such speech,99 would be subject to “less than strict review.”100
However, the First Amendment requires a full, “rigorous review” of commercial speech
regulations “unrelated to the preservation of a fair bargaining process[.]”101 Indeed,
the dangers of “bans on truthful . . . commercial speech cannot be explained away
by appeals to the ‘commonsense distinctions’ that exist between commercial and
noncommercial speech.”102
The Court effectively adopted the equivalency principle, extending full First
Amendment protection to truthful commercial speech in Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.103
IMS Health concerned a First Amendment challenge to a Vermont law that restricted
the sale or use of pharmaceutical data for marketing purposes.104 The law was designed
to prevent pharmaceutical companies from making use of data concerning the prescrib-
ing history of individual doctors in order to shape their advertising appeals to those
doctors.105 However, the state statute was construed not to bar the use of the very
same data by academic researchers.106 The Court found the law to be a “content- and
94 Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 426.
95 See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980).
96 Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 430.
97 517 U.S. 484 (1996) (plurality opinion).
98 Id. at 501.
99 Id. at 502 (citing Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 771 n.24 (1976)). But see id. at 523 n.4 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“The degree to which
these rationales truly justify treating ‘commercial’ speech differently from other speech (or in-
deed, whether the requisite distinction can even be drawn) is open to question, in my view.”
(citations omitted)).
100 Id. at 501.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 502 (citing Va. State Bd., 425 U.S. at 771 n.24).
103 564 U.S. 552 (2011).
104 Id. at 557, 561.
105 See id. at 558–59.
106 Id. at 563.
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speaker-based” restriction on protected speech,107 and thus required “heightened judicial
scrutiny.”108 The Court further held that “[c]ommercial speech is no exception” to the
required heightened judicial scrutiny of content-based speech restrictions.109 This appli-
cation of heightened scrutiny to content- or speaker-based restrictions on commercial
speech was a remarkable step forward for commercial speech protection, because, as
Justice Breyer correctly noted in dissent, no such restriction of commercial speech
“ha[d] ever before justified greater scrutiny when regulatory activity affects commercial
speech.”110 Indeed, wasn’t the inescapable consequence of the reduced protection for
commercial speech that there would be discrimination between commercial and non-
commercial speakers? By the Court’s reasoning in IMS Health, then, the Court’s own
commercial speech doctrine amounts to a discrimination deserving of strict scrutiny.
While the IMS Health Court reaffirmed that “the government’s legitimate
interest in protecting consumers from ‘commercial harms’ explains ‘why commer-
cial speech can be subject to greater governmental regulation than noncommercial
speech,’”111 the Court found that Vermont had failed to tie its restriction to any unique
commercial harm.112 Further, Vermont did not assert that pharmaceutical “detailing”
was false or misleading, nor that the law would proactively reduce some risk of false
or misleading commercial speech.113 Finally, while the Court did state that under the
Central Hudson test the regulation would have to “show at least that the statute
directly advance[d] a substantial governmental interest” and that there was a reason-
able fit between the regulation and that interest, it apparently did so only to show
that “the outcome is the same whether a special commercial speech inquiry or a
stricter form of judicial scrutiny is applied.”114 Thus, the Court found the content-
and speaker-based Vermont law to violate the First Amendment.115
IMS Health represents a capstone of sorts on the Court’s move toward acceptance
of the equivalency principle. At the very least, a synthesis of Discovery Network and
IMS Health strongly suggests that more invasive regulations of commercial speech can
be justified only by uniquely commercial harms, not by the precept that commercial
speech is inherently less valuable than noncommercial speech and thus receives less
107 Id.
108 Id. at 565.
109 Id. at 566.
110 Id. at 588 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
111 Id. at 579 (majority opinion) (quoting City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc.,
507 U.S. 410, 426 (1993); then citing 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 502
(1996) (plurality opinion)).
112 Id.; “[F]or example, . . . ‘a State may choose to regulate price advertising in one industry
but not in others, because the risk of fraud . . . is in its view greater there.’” Id. (third alteration
in original) (quoting R. A. V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388–89 (1992) then citing Va.
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771–72 (1976)).
113 Id.
114 Id. at 571–72 (citations omitted).
115 Id. at 578–80.
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First Amendment protection. In that manner, IMS Health suggests that commercial
speech regulations are subject to “a standard yet stricter than Central Hudson.”116
Indeed, at least one Justice openly regards IMS Health as an application of strict
scrutiny to commercial speech.117
B. The Theoretical Case for the Equivalency Principle
While it is certainly valuable and informative to understand how the Supreme
Court’s doctrine has evolved over the years, we of course understand that legal scholars
give at best limited force to purely doctrinal arguments. In this instance, however,
analysis of the underlying purposes of the First Amendment protection of free ex-
pression only reinforces the Court’s current doctrinal stance.
In undertaking this analysis, it is important to recall the Court’s definition of
commercial speech: speech that does no “more than propose a commercial transac-
tion.”118 Expression either objecting to a commercial transaction or speech neutrally
describing or commenting on commercial products or services, in contrast, are deemed
fully protected noncommercial speech.119 In light of this well-established distinction,
none of the scholarly arguments employed to reduce the level of First Amendment
protection for commercial speech on the basis of its lesser value to the goals of free
speech protection has any merit.
Initially, it should be noted that the argument that commercial speech is deserving
of a lower level of First Amendment protection because it does not concern the political
process, which is the type of speech thought by many to be most closely aligned
with the values fostered by that provision,120 proves far too much. Most commenta-
tors would readily concede that full First Amendment protection extends to many
more expressive categories than speech intertwined with the political process—for ex-
ample, art, music, and literature. Of course, the response might be made that speech
about the relative merits of commercial products and services is a far cry from art,
music, or literature as a means of fostering the underlying value of personal and intel-
lectual self-realization. Many years ago, one of us sought to respond to this argument
by pointing out that speech about the relative merits of commercial products and
services facilitates individual self-realization by providing information and opinion
relevant to an individual’s private self-governing decisions.121 The argument was
116 Id. at 588 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
117 See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2235 (2015) (Breyer, J., concurring).
118 See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
119 See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 821–22 (1975).
120 See generally ALEXANDER MEIKELJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM (1960) (discussing First
Amendment freedom of speech as a tool for self-governance); Robert H. Bork, Neutral
Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971) (arguing that “Consti-
tutional protection should be accorded only to speech that is explicitly political”).
121 See Martin H. Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace: Commercial Speech
and the Values of Free Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429, 438–43 (1971).
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made that it would make little sense to protect political speech on the grounds that
such speech facilitates collective self-government when the individual’s role in
making those self-governing decisions represents only a tiny fraction of the whole,
but simultaneously deny protection to commercial expression when such communi-
cations facilitate the making of life-affecting decisions that belong—both in terms of
choice and consequences—entirely to the individual.122 In a fundamental sense, it
was argued, both forms of expression facilitate the making of the individual’s life-
affecting, self-governing decisions, and therefore equally foster the key value under-
lying the constitutional protection of free expression—namely, realization of both
the individual’s personal goals and personal potential.123
In light of the Supreme Court’s subsequent definition of commercial speech,
however, it is unnecessary to delve into possible differences or similarities between
speech that facilitates the recipient’s private and collective self-government. While
the Court has on occasion wavered in its definition124 and has complicated that
definition with multi-factor tests of limited clarity and coherence,125 reduced to its
core, the definition of “commercial speech” generally employed by the Court is
speech that does no more than “propose[ ] a commercial transaction.”126 As a result,
speech concerning the relative merits of commercial products and services that does
something other than propose a commercial transaction—for example, Consumer
Reports Magazine,127 Ralph Nader’s criticism of the safety of the Chevrolet Corvair,128
or media revelations that Nike allegedly employed “sweat shop” labor in foreign
countries to produce its shoes129—receives full First Amendment protection. In stark
contrast, speech about the very same subjects disseminated to the very same audi-
ence is characterized as traditionally less protected “commercial speech” when it is
expressed by the manufacturer or seller.130 Purely as a logical matter, then, commercial
speech protection cannot be distinguished from fully protected noncommercial
122 See generally id.
123 Id. at 438–48.
124 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 561–62 (1980)
(“Commercial expression not only serves the economic interest of the speaker, but also as-
sists consumers and furthers the societal interest in the fullest possible dissemination of
information.”).
125 See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 68–69 (1983) (citing Cent. Hudson,
447 U.S. at 566).
126 See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 553–54 (2001) (referring to
“speech proposing a commercial transaction”).
127 See, e.g., Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 513 (1984) (ex-
tending full First Amendment protection to Consumer Reports).
128 See generally RALPH NADER, UNSAFE AT ANY SPEED: THE DESIGNED-IN DANGERS OF
THE AMERICAN AUTOMOBILE (1965).
129 See generally Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243 (Cal. 2002), cert. granted, 539 U.S.
1099 (2003), and cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 537 U.S. 654 (2003).
130 See Daniel A. Farber, Commercial Speech and First Amendment Theory, 74 NW. U.
L. REV. 372, 372–73 (1979).
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speech solely on the grounds that it deals with such mundane matters as the relative
merits of commercial purchases. Speech that receives full First Amendment protec-
tion deals with the very same issues. Indeed, if a commercial seller did no more than
reproduce the very same words said about its product in Consumer Reports, under
the Court’s definition of commercial speech, those exact same words would receive
a considerably lower level of protection, for no reason other than the commercial
motivation of the party uttering the expression in question. When one adds a
listener-centric perspective to First Amendment theory, then, the Court’s asserted
distinction between speech proposing a commercial transaction and speech neutral
about or opposing commercial transactions makes absolutely no sense.
Some would no doubt respond that it is the very fact of the speaker’s commer-
cial motivation that properly distinguishes the two types of expression, even though
they deal with the exact same subject (and, indeed, may even say the exact same
thing). Two different grounds have, over the years, been suggested to support this
speaker-based distinction. First, it has been suggested that commercial promotion
of sale is effectively part of the process of commercial sale and therefore is “linked
inextricably” to the commercial transactions themselves.131 Therefore, the argument
proceeds, commercial speech constitutes a form of conduct, rather than expression.
As one of us argued a number of years ago, however, “[i]t is only at the point of sale
that commercial advocacy is even arguably so temporarily linked to the acts of
purchase and sale that it can realistically be deemed an element of these acts.”132 The
mere fact that speech advocates action does not make the speech part of that action.
The second argument designed to distinguish speech about or opposing the sale
of commercial products and services from speech advocating purchase of commercial
products and services is the theory, associated primarily with Robert Post,133 that speech
designed for the purpose of commercial profit is automatically not speech designed to
contribute to public discourse, and it is only the latter type of expression that is deserv-
ing of full First Amendment protection.134 There is no need to rehash all of the argu-
ments pointing out the serious flaws in this theory, since one of us has already done so
in detail.135 Suffice it to say at this point that while Post has on occasion suggested
that a court should engage in a case-by-case evaluation of speech and its speaker to
determine whether the speech represents “an effort to engage in public opinion,”136
131 Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 10–11 n.9 (1979); see also Farber, supra note 130,
at 386–90.
132 MARTIN H. REDISH, MONEY TALKS: SPEECH, ECONOMIC POWER, AND THE VALUES OF
DEMOCRACY 33 (2001).
133 See generally Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA
L. REV. 1 (2000).
134 See id. at 14–15.
135 See MARTIN H. REDISH, THE ADVERSARY FIRST AMENDMENT: FREE EXPRESSION AND
THE FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 43–69 (2013).
136 Post, supra note 133, at 18.
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an “engagement . . . in the public life of the nation,”137 or an individual’s “attempt to
render the state responsive to [her] views,”138 it is certainly true that “[a] good deal of
speech, not just commercial speech, would be excluded from public discourse if Post
applied this approach consistently.”139
In any event, it is not immediately clear why commercial speech does not qualify
as a contribution to public discourse. The speech is certainly not distributed pri-
vately or secretly to only a limited audience. Nor is it clear why—as is true of most
speakers—commercial speakers may not have multiple motives for their expression.
It is by no means obvious why expression cannot be intended simultaneously for pur-
poses of personal gain and for purposes of contributing to public discourse. Post’s
assumption of mutual exclusivity has no basis in logic or reality.
The most troublesome aspect of such a speaker-oriented approach is that it
ignores the simple fact that free expression is as much about the listener as it is
about the speaker. Indeed, at least one leading free speech theorist has actually argued
that the only legitimate value served by free expression is to the listener.140 While
this viewpoint is, we believe, fatally narrow, it is certainly true that free and open
expression provides potentially valuable information and opinion to the listener that
enables her to make life affecting choices, and in so doing facilitate realization of
her life goals.141 In facilitating individual self-realization, the listener’s receipt of
communication fosters First Amendment values, regardless of its impact on the
speaker. But if this is so, what possible difference, in terms of the values fostered by
the expression, does the motivation of the speaker make? The speaker can be motivated
solely by purposes of private gain, and the expression may nevertheless make an
important contribution to public discourse. In any event, numerous speakers have
an agenda of personal gain—hidden or open—for their expression and in no other
area of First Amendment protection is the level of protection reduced because of this
fact.142 There is therefore no principled reason for categorically reducing the level
of First Amendment protection to commercial speech on the basis of the speaker’s
profit incentive.
The greatest concern with defining the less-protected category of commercial
speech solely on the basis of the speaker’s profit motivation is that it inevitably leads
to blatant viewpoint-based stratification in the level of free speech expression. A
speaker who argues against commercial purchase is extended full First Amendment
protection, while a speaker who seeks to respond to that argument by advocating
137 Id. at 20.
138 Id. at 27.
139 REDISH, supra note 132, at 66.
140 See generally MEIKELJOHN, supra note 120; see also REDISH, supra note 135, at 38.
141 For a more detailed description of this self-realization theory, see generally Martin H.
Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591 (1982).
142 See generally REDISH, supra note 132 (discussing First Amendment speech in Ameri-
can democracy).
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commercial purchase is denied full First Amendment protection. Examples, as already
noted, include Ralph Nader receiving full First Amendment protection for his attack
on the Chevrolet Corvair while General Motors receives a significantly lower level
of protection of its responsive defense, or media commentators receiving full First
Amendment protection for their allegations that Nike uses sweat shops, while Nike
receives a much lower level of protection for its counter-speech.143 Surely, the First
Amendment cannot be satisfied by such a blatantly selective disparity in First Amend-
ment protection.144
Finally, it might be argued that commercial speech is deserving of a lower level
of protection because there is greater concern about the motivation of the regulator
in the context of noncommercial speech. When government regulates political speech,
the argument could be made that there is always a real concern that the regulators
are motivated by political hostility—a concern generally assumed to be irrelevant
in the case of commercial speech regulation. But this argument once again proves
too much, because the relevant dichotomy is not between commercial and political
speech, but rather between commercial and noncommercial speech. As previously
explained, the latter category includes far more than political speech.145 Indeed, as
already shown, it includes all speech about the relative merits of commercial products
and services communicated by any speaker who is not seeking to engage in commer-
cial sale.146 If anything, there is a stronger basis of suspicion of regulatory motives for
suppressing speech when speech about commercial products is made by the seller,
since there always exists the danger that competitors have enlisted the help of the
regulators to take away the speaker’s competitive advantage. Lastly, excessive regu-
latory zeal, which fails to take into account the fundamentally important value of
free expression, is as likely a basis for pathological suppression of expression as is
political motivation.
C. The Equivalency Principle and the Danger of Dilution
It might be suggested that use of the equivalency principle to assume value
fungibility between commercial and noncommercial speech gives rise to the serious
danger of dilution. In other words, because it is generally assumed that commercial
speech must be extensively regulated, the assumption that commercial and noncom-
mercial speech are on some level fungible would require us to allow far more exten-
sive regulation of noncommercial speech than is generally deemed acceptable.147 As
143 See supra notes 128–30 and accompanying text.
144 R. A. V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 392 (1992) (“St. Paul has no such authority
to license one side of a debate to fight freestyle, while requiring the other to follow Marquis
[sic] of Queensberry rules.”).
145 See supra notes 116–30 and accompanying text.
146 See supra notes 123–30 and accompanying text.
147 See, e.g., Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85
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a result, in the hope of expanding the reach of First Amendment protection, we will
have counterproductively reduced the scope of such protection. Simply put, this is
known as the danger of dilution.
The first point to note in response is that, as we will show in subsequent discus-
sions, the mere fact that commercial speech is assumed to serve First Amendment
values in the same manner as noncommercial speech does not necessarily mean that
the two are always to be treated identically for First Amendment purposes.148 Where
commercial speech gives rise to significantly greater risks of serious harm than would
most noncommercial speech, such expression may logically be regulated more in-
vasively than noncommercial speech, despite the assumption of value equivalency.149
But wholly beyond that point, the greatest flaw in the dilution argument is that it is,
at its core, question begging: it assumes the answer to the issue in dispute—i.e., whether
commercial speech should be deemed to serve the same values as noncommercial
speech. One cannot logically answer that question by saying we should not treat
them identically, because noncommercial speech has greater value. That is the very
question at issue. If one ultimately decides that commercial speech is in fact value-
equivalent to noncommercial speech, then any dilution that might result is totally
proper. In short, the dilution argument ignores the key question subject to debate.
To be sure, there may be instances in which noncommercial speech gives rise
to the very same harm as commercial speech. For example, imagine two situations:
(1) a commercial advertiser, with knowledge of his statement’s falsity, makes a false
claim about his product’s scientific qualities. For a variety of reasons discussed
subsequently,150 such expression should be deemed to give rise to harm of such
intensity as to justify suppression; (2) a scientist, for whatever reason, writes an article
in a popularly distributed magazine making the exact same claim for the product’s
scientific properties, with full knowledge of the claim’s falsity. Under the equivalency
principle, the expression in both hypotheticals serve the very same First Amendment
value, and both give rise to the same potential for harm. Therefore, logically, the two
examples of expression are deserving of identical treatment, even though one is
classified as commercial and the other as noncommercial.
Another key point missed by the dilution argument is that an important concern
underlying the equivalency principle concerns the impact of suppression on the
nature of the relationship between government and citizen. In the noncommercial
setting, government is denied power to suppress truthful speech out of a fear that
citizens will make “wrong” choices, because such paternalism on the part of govern-
ment is inconsistent with the fundamental premises of liberal democracy: govern-
ment may not manipulate citizens’ lawful choices by selective suppression of free
COLUM. L. REV. 449, 451 (1985) (arguing “that continually applicable doctrines be formulated
with emphasis on how well they would serve in the worst of times”).
148 See infra Part III.
149 See infra Part III.
150 See infra Part III.
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expression. But if this fundamental precept of democratic thought applies in the con-
text of noncommercial speech, there is no reason to deem it automatically inapplicable
to commercial speech. Citizens are either sheep, or they are not. We cannot ratio-
nally deem selective suppression of speech designed to manipulate lawful behavior
by citizens politically pathological in one context but benign in the others. Thus,
rejection of the equivalency principle gives rise to a serious danger of what can be
called reverse dilution. If one rejects the equivalency principle, government is allowed
to suppress even truthful commercial speech for fear that the recipients of the in-
formation will make the wrong decision on the basis of it. But people cannot be
deemed too stupid to process truthful information advocating lawful activity in the
commercial realm yet trustworthy to do so in the political realm. Thus, if one accepts
the initial premise that citizens cannot be trusted to make commercial decisions on
the basis of truthful advocacy and debate, one could quite easily transfer that skepti-
cism about citizen capability to political judgments, thereby justifying widespread
selective suppression of political debate.
Most importantly, the fundamental concern of the dilution argument is under-
mined by the definition of commercial speech that the Court has adopted. Recall
once again that the category has been defined not by the subject of the expression
but rather by the motivation of the speaker.151 The result, as already shown, is a
pathological viewpoint-based dichotomy of protection in important public debates,
grounded in nothing more than distaste for the motivation of the speaker.152
II. FALSE COMMERCIAL SPEECH AND THE EQUIVALENCY PRINCIPLE
A. The Doctrinal Status of False Commercial Speech
In the prior Part, we explored the equivalency principle’s application, both doc-
trinally and normatively, to the regulation of truthful commercial speech. In an
important sense that discussion served as a prelude to the issue at hand: the extent
to which the equivalency principle should similarly be applied to false commercial
speech. It is important to understand that we are not asking whether false commer-
cial speech should receive absolute protection. False noncommercial speech in no
way receives absolute protection; indeed, in certain situations it receives no constitu-
tional protection at all. The equivalency principle demands only a relative judgment,
requiring that however noncommercial speech is treated, commercial speech is
deemed to be of equivalent First Amendment value. In other words, the equivalency
principle demands a type of “most favored nation” status for commercial speech.
It is important to note that application of the equivalency principle would not
dictate that in all instances commercial speech would be protected as often as false
151 See supra notes 124–30.
152 See supra notes 124–30.
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noncommercial speech would be protected. It means, simply, that if commercial speech
is not to be protected when parallel noncommercial speech would be protected, that
difference in constitutional treatment is due not to a judgment about the relative
value of the speech in question to the purposes served by the First Amendment right
of free expression, but rather because commercial speech gives rise to the danger of
more significant harm than does the similarly situated noncommercial speech.
There can be no doubt, however, that, at least purely as a doctrinal matter, the
equivalency principle has never been applied to false commercial speech. This is so,
despite the fact that a strong doctrinal case can be made for the proposition that this
principle has been doctrinally adopted by the Court for truthful commercial speech.153
Recall that the very first prong of the Central Hudson test involves an inquiry
into whether the commercial speech in question is false or misleading, or uttered on
behalf of an illegal product or activity.154 If the answer to either of those inquiries
is in the affirmative, the speech was automatically and categorically excluded from
the scope of First Amendment protection.155 The level of awareness on behalf of the
commercial speaker of the speech’s falsity, under the Central Hudson test, was
wholly irrelevant.156 Rather, the Central Hudson standard was one of strict liability.157
While, as already shown, the level of First Amendment protection for truthful com-
mercial speech has changed dramatically since the Court’s adoption of the Central
Hudson test in 1980,158 the categorical exclusion of First Amendment protection for
false commercial speech has budged not an inch.159 As the following discussion
shows, this categorical exclusion of First Amendment protection differs dramatically
from the level of First Amendment protection given to false noncommercial speech.
B. False Noncommercial Speech and the First Amendment
As the middle of the twentieth century approached, it would probably have been
safe to say that at least most forms of false expression were categorically excluded from
the First Amendment’s protective scope.160 This was particularly true of defamatory
153 See supra Part I.
154 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 563–64 (1980).
155 See id.
156 See id. at 563–66.
157 See id.
158 See supra notes 13–21 and accompanying text.
159 See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
160 See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942) (“There are certain
well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which
have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and ob-
scene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or ‘fighting’ words—those which by their very
utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.”(footnote omitted));
see also Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266–67 (1952) (holding that a prohibition on
group defamation did not violate the First Amendment).
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speech—false expression that damaged an individual’s reputation.161 In subsequent
years, however, the Court recognized that the issue is far more complex than the
simple categorical rejection of First Amendment protection for false speech assumed.
In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,162 the Court held that the First Amendment
precludes imposition of liability for defamation of a public official unless the plain-
tiff proves by the heavier-than-normal burden of clear and convincing evidence that
the defendant acted with “actual malice.”163 The Court reasoned that the First Amend-
ment requires that debate about public officials be “uninhibited, robust, and wide-
open[.]”164 The Court recognized “[t]hat erroneous statement is inevitable in free
debate, and . . . it must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the
‘breathing space’ that they ‘need . . . to survive[.]’”165
Although several of the Justices believed that such defamatory expression
deserved absolute protection regardless of the speaker’s awareness of falsity,166 a
majority was unwilling to go that far. While the majority was willing to extend First
Amendment protection even to negligently false defamation, it drew the line at out-
right lying—hence the exception for defamation that constituted “actual malice.”167
Despite its name, that phrase has never had anything to do with ill will or malicious
intent. Rather, it refers to knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of the state-
ment’s truth or falsity.168 “Reckless disregard” has been given an extremely narrow
definition, requiring a showing that a false publication was made with a “high degree
of awareness of . . . probable falsity.”169 For recklessness to be established, the Court
has stated, “[t]here must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the
defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication.”170
161 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 268–69 (1964) (recognizing its own precedent
of not protecting libelous speech).
162 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
163 Id. at 279–80, 285–86.
164 Id. at 270.
165 Id. at 271–72 (third alteration in original) (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,
433 (1963)).
166 Id. at 293–97 (Black, J., concurring); id. at 297–305 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
167 See id. at 279–80 (majority opinion).
168 Id. at 280.
169 Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964).
170 St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968); see also id. at 732 (showing of reck-
less disregard requires proof that “allegations are so inherently improbable that only a reckless
man would have put them in circulation. Likewise, recklessness may be found where there
are obvious reasons to doubt the veracity of the informant or the accuracy of his reports.” (foot-
note omitted)). In St. Amant, according to a subsequent lower court decision,
the record did not support a finding of reckless disregard for the accuracy
of statements even though the defendant had no personal knowledge of
the plaintiff’s activities, relied solely on an affidavit, failed to verify the
information by those who might have known the facts, did not consider
whether the statements defamed the plaintiff, and mistakenly believed
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That the Court has drawn a clear distinction between recklessness and gross
negligence was underscored in its subsequent decision in Harte-Hanks Communica-
tions, Inc. v. Connaughton.171 The Court there noted that the standard that Justice
Harlan had advocated in his plurality opinion in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,172
where he had suggested that a public figure need only make “a showing of highly
unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from the standards of inves-
tigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers[,]”173 “was
emphatically rejected by a majority of the [Curtis] Court in favor of the stricter New
York Times actual malice rule.”174 A synthesis of these decisions reveals that the
Supreme Court has construed the First Amendment to impose a highly demanding
showing in order to establish the reckless disregard sufficient to satisfy New York
Times’s actual malice standard.175 For purposes of the First Amendment, reckless-
ness does not include the mere failure to investigate, even if such failure is appropri-
ately characterized as grossly negligent.176 Rather, recklessness demands a showing
that the defendant inexplicably ignored a strong basis for suspicion of falsity.177 This
is not merely a difference in degree from any form of negligence. It is, rather, a dif-
ference in kind.
While the New York Times doctrine was employed originally with regard to
defamation of public officials, it was quickly expanded to include defamation of
public figures, even if they did not hold governmental office.178 In Dun & Bradstreet,
Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.,179 which involved a suit against an information
provider for an allegedly inaccurate report, the Court adopted as the central inquiry
for the reach of the doctrine whether “matters of public concern” are involved.180
That the Court has extended the doctrine far and wide into the world of com-
merce is demonstrated by its decision in Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United
States, Inc.181 Bose involved a commercial disparagement suit brought by a corpora-
tion against the publisher of Consumer Reports for allegedly false critical comments
he was not responsible for the broadcast because he was merely quoting
the affiant’s words.
Campbell v. Citizens for an Honest Gov’t, 255 F.3d 560, 570 (8th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted).
171 491 U.S. 657 (1989).
172 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (plurality opinion).
173 Id. at 155.
174 Harte-Hanks, 491 U.S. at 666 (emphasis added).
175 See supra notes 160–71 and accompanying text.
176 See supra notes 160–71 and accompanying text.
177 See supra notes 160–71 and accompanying text.
178 See, e.g., Curtis, 388 U.S. at 155.
179 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
180 Id. at 751, 761; see also id. at 762 n.8 (“The protection to be accorded a particular
credit report depends on whether the report’s ‘content, form, and context’ indicate that it concerns
a public matter.”).
181 466 U.S. 485 (1984).
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about its speakers.182 The magazine is designed to be an objective commentator on
the relative merits of commercial products and services.183 Without the slightest
analysis, the Court simply assumed that the disparagement claim was limited by the
First Amendment doctrine of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, rendering the pub-
lisher liable only if the plaintiff could establish by clear and convincing evidence
that the defendant uttered the false statements with “actual malice”—either knowl-
edge of their falsity or reckless disregard of their truth or falsity.184 However, as
already noted, that doctrine has been held categorically inapplicable to regulation
of commercial speech, defined not as speech concerning commercial sales and
transactions but rather as speech promoting commercial sale.185 In this context, the
Court has consistently applied a strict liability standard, categorically excluding all
false commercial speech from the scope of First Amendment protection.186
In certain noncommercial speech contexts, the Court appears to have held that
even consciously false speech is protected by the First Amendment. In United States
v. Alvarez,187 the Court found unconstitutional the Stolen Valor Act, which made it
a crime to falsely claim receipt of military decorations or medals and provided for
enhanced penalties if the Congressional Medal of Honor is involved,188 even when
the defendant’s falsehood was unambiguously uttered with knowledge of its falsity.189
The plurality opinion by Justice Kennedy rejected the government’s argument that
false speech was inherently valueless and therefore undeserving of First Amendment
protection.190 The opinion distinguished the three examples of criminal punishment
for false speech to which the government pointed on the grounds that each of those
instances inherently involved “legally cognizable” harm caused by the falsehoods.191
In contrast, the plurality could find no harm caused by the false assertion that one
was a Congressional Medal of Honor winner.192
One could well debate the validity of the plurality’s cavalier dismissal of harm
flowing from the defendant’s false assertion. For one thing, the inherent value of the
medal itself could arguably be diluted as a result of the defendant’s false assertion.
For another thing, the defendant in Alvarez made the knowingly false assertion while
182 Id. at 488.
183 See Paul Hiebert, Consumer Reports in the Age of Amazon Review, ATLANTIC (Apr. 13,
2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/04/consumer-reports-in-the-age
-of-the-amazon-review/477108/ [https://perma.cc/74ZH-BEJF].
184 Bose, 466 U.S. at 497–502.
185 See supra Section I.A.1.
186 See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
187 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012) (plurality opinion).
188 18 U.S.C. § 704(b)–(c) (2006), invalidated by United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct.
2537 (2012).
189 Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2551 (plurality opinion).
190 Id. at 2544–47.
191 Id. at 2545–47.
192 See id. at 2545.
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attending his first public meeting as a member of the local water district board, a gov-
ernment entity, arguably giving rise to a claim of fraud on the public.193 But for
present purposes, the correctness of the Court’s conclusion under the specific facts of
the case is irrelevant. The key point, rather, concerns where the Court chose to place
the First Amendment inertia when it comes to knowingly false speech. Rather than
begin analysis with the premise that speech is not protectable unless it can be shown
to have value—i.e., directly further the values served by the constitutional guarantee
of free expression—it began with the completely opposite premise: Speech is protected,
regardless of value, unless it can be shown to cause legally cognizable harm.194
The doctrinal disparity between the First Amendment treatment given to false
commercial speech and false noncommercial speech should now be obvious. False
commercial speech never receives protection, while the Court begins with a rebut-
table presumption in favor of protection for false noncommercial speech.195 To
summarize the Court’s approach to generally disseminated false noncommercial
speech: For the most part, unknowingly false noncommercial speech is protected
against penalization even where the speech gives rise to serious and unique harm,
such as reputational harm. However, knowingly false noncommercial speech that
gives rise to serious and unique harm is unprotected. False noncommercial speech
that gives rise to nothing more than general political harm to society caused by de-
ception of the electorate is protected even if it is communicated with knowledge of
falsity.196 Thus, the Court’s disparate treatment of false commercial speech clearly
193 See id. at 2542.
194 See id. at 2545–47. Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion spoke for himself and three
other Justices. Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Kagan, concurred in the judgment. Unlike
the plurality, Justice Breyer did not rest his conclusion “upon a strict categorical analysis.”
Id. at 2551 (Breyer, J., concurring). Rather, he found the Act unconstitutional by means of
intermediate scrutiny. Id. at 2551–52. He noted that
[f]alse factual statements can serve useful human objectives, for example:
in social contexts, where they may prevent embarrassment, protect pri-
vacy, shield a person from prejudice, provide the sick with comfort, or
preserve a child’s innocence; in public contexts, where they may stop
a panic or otherwise preserve calm in the face of danger; and even in
technical, philosophical, and scientific contexts, where . . . examination
of a false statement (even if made deliberately to mislead) can promote
a form of thought that ultimately helps realize the truth.
Id. at 2553 (citation omitted). None of these contexts, of course, was fostered by Alvarez’s
falsehood. See generally Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (plurality opinion).
195 See id. at 2544–45.
196 It should be noted that in the special context of a one-on-one professional fiduciary
relationship, such as doctor-patient, even negligently false speech will be unprotected. However,
this is a situation of unique vulnerability on the part of the recipient of the information, and the
special obligation imposed on the professional speaker due to the professional relationship be-
tween speaker and listener. In any event, it seems reasonable to conclude that such speech
will usually go well beyond the “promotion” of a commercial transaction, and therefore it is not
properly characterized as “commercial speech.”
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constitutes a stark aberration from the equivalency principle, which the Court appears
to have recently adopted in the case of truthful commercial speech.197 Whether this
disparity can be rationally justified, however, is quite a different matter. It is to that
question that we now turn.
C. Can the False Commercial/Noncommercial Speech Distinction Be Justified?
Why is false commercial speech automatically excluded from the scope of First
Amendment protection while the constitutional treatment of false noncommercial
speech is far more complex? The answer the Court has given to that question, in-
terestingly, was provided in a context in no way confined to the protection given to
false commercial speech. Rather, the Court in Virginia Board, the decision which
first extended significant First Amendment protection to commercial speech, sought
to provide reasons why all commercial speech was inherently deserving of a lower
level of First Amendment protection.198 But in doing so, the Court at most provided
arguable rationales for distinguishing false commercial and noncommercial speech.199
The Court suggested two grounds on which to distinguish commercial speech from
other forms of speech protection: (1) that “[t]he truth of commercial speech . . . may
be more easily verifiable by its disseminator than . . . news reporting or political
commen-tary [sic],”200 and (2) that “[s]ince advertising is the sine qua non of com-
mercial profits, there is little likelihood of its being chilled by proper regulation.”201
Justice Stewart, concurring, added that commercial advertisers do not suffer from the
burdens on “the press, which must often attempt to assemble the true facts from sketchy
and sometimes conflicting sources under the pressure of publication deadlines[.]”202
Even if one were to accept the validity of these distinctions, the equivalency
principle would not necessarily be undermined. These distinctions in no way turn
on a comparative assessment of the value of the expression itself, but rather on the
basis of factors supposedly unique to commercial speech that reduce the harm to
First Amendment values flowing from suppression. Nevertheless, there are serious
reasons to doubt the validity of the asserted distinctions.
Initially, one may question whether as a general matter the truth of commercial
claims is, in all instances, more easily verifiable than the truth of noncommercial
assertions. Numerous statements made in the course of political debate involve
simple assertions of fact, which are presumably verifiable with relative ease. Indeed,
it is just such assertions whose accuracy political fact checkers measure regularly.203
197 See supra Section I.A.
198 See supra Section I.A.
199 See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
761–72 & n.24 (1976).
200 Id. at 772 n.24.
201 Id.
202 Id. at 777 (Stewart, J., concurring).
203 See MARTIN H. REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 64 (1984).
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In contrast, many claims about commercial products involve scientific assertions
that are often subject to complex and controversial debate.204 Secondly, there is no
reason to assume that commercial speech is inherently “hardier” because of the
existence of the profit motive.205 Numerous noncommercial publications are driven
by profit motive as much as commercial speakers are. And countless contributors
to public discourse have a personal interest—often financial—in acceptance of their
public claims. If commercial speakers are assumed not to be deterred by penalization
if their speech turns out to be false, it is unclear why self-interested noncommercial
speakers are any more likely to be deterred. Logically, if any distinction is to be
drawn it should be one between self-interested and non-self-interested speech, on
the grounds that the variety of self-interested speech is inherently suspect. Whatever
one thinks of such a distinction (and we suspect that virtually everyone would quite
wisely reject it), that distinction is by no means equivalent to the commercial/
noncommercial distinction. Obviously, countless self-interested speakers engage in
noncommercial speech.206 Indeed, commercial speakers are often likely to be among
the most risk averse of speakers, always concerned about the possibility of govern-
ment penalization for their actions.207 The issue, for First Amendment purposes,
should not be whether the speaker will be deterred from speaking at all; but rather,
whether the speaker will be chilled from making specific statements for fear they
will be deemed false when with perfect knowledge we would know that they are in
fact true and quite relevant to the listeners’ decision-making.
Finally, one may legitimately question arguments based on deadline pressure.
Noncommercial stories of long-range interest have no immediate deadline pressure.208
In contrast, “some advertisers who . . . attempt[ ] to defeat a competitor or to gain
first entry into a new market” may find timing to be critical.209 As a result they, much
like many noncommercial speakers, face significant time pressure.210 In any event,
there is no reason to believe that the New York Times Co. “actual malice” test ex-
tends only to the commercial press. Rather, it extends to private speakers who face
no deadline pressures.211
Some might seek to distinguish between false commercial and noncommercial
speech on the grounds that the latter categorically constitutes a contribution to public
discourse while the former categorically does not. Robert Post has made just such
an argument.212 But as already shown, the idea that commercial speech inherently
204 See id.
205 See id.
206 See generally REDISH, supra note 135 (demonstrating that American government is an
adversary democracy).
207 See REDISH, supra note 203, at 143–44.




212 See supra notes 133–34 and accompanying text.
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makes no contribution to public discourse is grounded in nothing more than the con-
clusory assertion that it fails to do so.213
It might be argued that while truthful commercial speech could conceivably
make legitimate contributions to public discourse, false commercial speech does not.
Once again, however, we should note that, logically, the same could be said of false
noncommercial speech, which, in and of itself, fosters no First Amendment value.
Of course, in New York Times Co., the Court recognized this fact but nevertheless
decided to protect certain forms of false political speech in order to avoid a chilling
of potentially valuable truthful speech.214 But for reasons just explained, there is no
legitimate basis on which to assume that commercial speakers are not subject to a
similar form of chill. While commercial speakers are always incentivized to promote
their products and services due to their inherent profit incentive, as already noted
many noncommercial speakers are similarly motivated by speaker self-interest.215
The issue is not whether the speakers will speak, but what they will say. It is quite
plausible that because of their profit incentive, commercial speakers will be inher-
ently risk averse in what claims they make for their products. Such risk aversion could
conceivably deter them from communicating information about their products that, if
they had perfect knowledge prior to communicating, they would know would be ac-
cepted as truthful. This describes the classic chilling effect that the New York Times
Co. Court sought to avoid in shaping the actual malice doctrine in the first place.216
This does not mean that false commercial speech should always receive the
same level of First Amendment protection given false noncommercial speech. To
the extent they differ, however, it is not due to the lower value of commercial speech
in general or false commercial speech in particular. Rather, it is because of the
varying intensity of harm caused by the different forms of false speech.
When one synthesizes the New York Times Co. v. Sullivan line of cases in the
defamation context with the Court’s more recent decision in Alvarez,217 one is left
with the following doctrinal framework for First Amendment protection of false non-
commercial speech: conscious falsehoods that cause legally cognizable harm are not
protected. However, in the case of unintentional false speech, protection is extended
even in the face of cognizable harm.218 The Court, in drawing such a distinction, is
motivated by its desire to avoid chilling valuable expression. In the case of con-
scious falsehood, the Court has concluded that where noticeable harm is caused, the
expression loses its protection.219 However, where no legally cognizable harm results,
even consciously false speech is protected.220 What this synthesis shows is that the
213 See supra Section I.B.
214 See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964).
215 See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
216 N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 266, 276.
217 See supra Section II.B.
218 See supra Section II.B.
219 United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2545 (2012) (plurality opinion).
220 See id.
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Court’s treatment of consciously false speech turns not on an assessment of value
but rather on an assessment of harm. It logically follows that application of the
equivalency principle to false commercial speech does not mean that false commer-
cial speech is to be no more refutable than false noncommercial speech, but rather
simply that to the extent false commercial speech is to be suppressed more exten-
sively, it will be as a result of the greater harm it causes, rather than its lesser value.
The best way to understand this harm-based dichotomy is by development of a
taxonomy of categorical harms to which false speech may give rise, and then ap-
plication of that taxonomy to the commercial/noncommercial distinction. In that
way, we will be able to understand how one can simultaneously adhere to the equiv-
alency principle, yet, in certain contexts, still provide lesser protection to false
commercial speech.
III. APPLYING THE EQUIVALENCY PRINCIPLE TO FALSE COMMERCIAL SPEECH:
THE TAXONOMY OF HARMS
Recall that under the equivalency principle, commercial speech cannot be given
lesser First Amendment protection on the grounds that it is of less value to the
interests of the First Amendment.221 To suggest that the exact same fully protected
speech conveyed to the exact same audience is somehow of less value simply
because the speaker is motivated by commercial profit is either wholly illogical or
nothing more than ideologically driven discrimination against the capitalistic system
of which the speech is a central element.222 It does not necessarily follow, however,
that all false commercial speech must receive the same level of First Amendment
protection extended to noncommercial speech. It simply means that to the extent the
two categories of speech are to be treated differently, it must be for some principled
reason other than gradation in First Amendment value.
To the extent that commercial speech may be given lesser protection, it can be
due to one of two conceivable reasons: (1) protected commercial speech is not
negatively impacted in the same way that noncommercial speech would be impacted
by the same manner of regulation;223 or (2) commercial speech gives rise to a unique
level of harm to which noncommercial speech does not.224 The prior Part demon-
strated the speciousness of the former basis of distinction.225 The second basis of
distinction, however, is more complex and actually may in fact justify reduced
constitutional protection for false commercial speech in certain contexts.
221 See supra Part I.
222 For a detailed exploration of this theory see generally REDISH, supra note 135, at
75–121.
223 See supra Section II.C.
224 See supra Section II.C.
225 See supra Section II.C.
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As to the first grounds for distinction, we have already shown that every basis used
to justify providing a lower level of protection for false commercial speech than false
noncommercial speech ultimately fails.226 Thus, under the equivalency principle, to
the extent that false commercial and noncommercial speech are to be distinguished for
purposes of constitutional protection, it must be on the second ground—that false com-
mercial speech gives rise to a uniquely significant danger of harm. This insight leads
to the recognition of the need for a framing of a taxonomy of categorical harms to
which false speech can give rise, and then a determination of whether false commercial
speech gives rise to harms society deems of sufficient gravity to justify suppres-
sion—harms to which false noncommercial speech categorically may not give rise.
We discern five categorical harms to which false speech may conceivably give
rise: (1) financial; (2) political; (3) reputational; (4) health and safety; and (5) inter-
personal. By “financial,” we mean the listeners’ loss of money as a direct result of
reasonable reliance on the false speech of the speaker. This basically describes the
classic situation of commercial fraud. By “political,” we mean harm that flows in the
form of governmental choices not consistent with the true desires or interests of the
listeners, caused by the listener’s reliance on false representations about the speaker’s
qualifications for office or past accomplishments. By “reputational,” we mean harm
caused by false statements about a person that cause her reputation to be undermined
or damaged among the listeners or readers. By “health and safety,” we mean harm
to the well-being of the listeners caused by the listeners’ reasonable reliance on the
speaker’s false statements about the impact of a product or practice on the listeners’
health (for example, “drink this product once a day and it will make you feel great”
when in reality doing so will cause serious internal harm). By “interpersonal,” we
mean personal decisions that the listener may make because of the listeners’ reliance
on the speaker’s false statements (for example, inducing the listener to engage in sexual
relations on the basis of the false assertion that the speaker is an astronaut, or that
the speaker is free of sexually transmitted diseases). We believe that to the extent that
false speech gives rise to harm, that harm will fall within one of these five categories.
Note, however, that the categories are not necessarily mutually exclusive. For
example, false speech could simultaneously undermine health and safety as well as
cause damage to listeners’ financial interests. A false claim that a product will im-
prove health when in reality it will undermine health simultaneously threatens health
and safety and gives rise to financial harm.
If one examines the noncommercial speech doctrinal landscape, one quickly
sees—as we have previously shown—that it is by no means the case that all false
noncommercial speech is protected. In numerous situations, harm-causing, know-
ingly false noncommercial speech is excluded from the scope of First Amendment
protection. For example, this is clearly so for reputational harm, even when the
speech concerns core elements of the political process.227 If one candidate or her
226 See supra Section II.C.
227 See supra Section II.B.
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supporter in the midst of the campaign defames her opponent with knowledge of the
statement’s falsity, that speech is unprotected by the First Amendment, even though it
is properly characterized as pure political speech.228 Similarly, noncommercial speech
that intentionally defrauds listeners or readers out of money is no more protected than
fraud in the purely commercial context. If one needs proof of this fact, one need only
consider the examples of writers Stephen Glass and Jayson Blair, both of whom in-
tentionally falsified stories for their publications (the New Republic and the New York
Times, respectively).229 Both were potentially subject to liability for fraud, and no
one even suggested that their actions were protected by the First Amendment merely
because their articles appeared in fully protected publications or concerned matters
of public importance.230 And this result makes perfect sense, as both practical and
constitutional matters. Similarly, if a candidate for office knowingly misrepresents
his qualifications in an effort to convince potential contributors to make contributions
to his campaign, that speech should be as punishable as any commercial fraud—
behavior that neither should be nor is ever protected by the First Amendment.
Similarly, speech promoting the health and safety benefits of a product uttered
with knowledge of the falsity of that speech should never receive First Amendment
protection. This is true, regardless of whether or not the speech comes in the form of
commercial or noncommercial speech. By way of illustration, consider the following
hypothetical situation: The manufacturer of bee pollen takes out an advertisement
claiming health effects of the product, with knowledge that such a claim is false. No
one, presumably, would dispute that such expression falls outside the protective reach
of the First Amendment. Now assume that instead of including the speech in the
form of an advertisement, the manufacturer writes a book that makes the very same
knowingly false claims. Assuming the book reaches roughly the same audience that
is reached by the advertisement, by what logic could we deny First Amendment pro-
tection to the former but grant it to the latter? The two forms of expression are, in
our hypothetical, assumed to give rise to the exact same nature and degree of harm;
the two forms of expression are both assumed to have been made with full knowl-
edge of falsity. The only distinction is that the former comes in the form of tradi-
tional commercial speech while the latter comes in the form of traditionally protected
noncommercial speech. Having anything turn on this distinction for First Amendment
purposes does nothing more than place form over substance.
Consider also a different hypothetical: Assume that the speaker stands to make no
commercial profit out of convincing the listeners of health benefits or lack of health
228 See supra Section II.B.
229 See New York Times: Reporter Routinely Faked Articles, CNN (May 11, 2003, 4:30 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/Northeast/05/10/ny.times.reporter/ [https://perma.cc/5YSZ
-XDUL]; Hanna Rosin, Hello, My Name Is Stephen Glass, and I’m Sorry, NEW REPUBLIC
(Nov. 10, 2014), https://newrepublic.com/article/120145/stephen-glass-new-republic-scan
dal-still-haunts-his-law-career [https://perma.cc/7JSB-DJPJ].
230 See New York Times: Reporter Routinely Faked Articles, supra note 229; Rosin, supra
note 229.
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risks of a particular product. Instead, the speaker makes the claims with full knowledge
of their falsity, simply as a prank or purely out of vindictiveness. Should the fact that
the speech is not uttered for purposes of commercial profit lead to the conclusion that
it is deserving of First Amendment protection? Such a conclusion, would, of course,
be pure nonsense. The speech gives rise to the exact same level of serious harm,
whether it is uttered for purposes of commercial profit or for purposes of vindictive-
ness or misguided playfulness. Such knowingly false speech no more serves First
Amendment values than does commercially motivated knowingly false speech.
Note, however, that under our proposed model, in the case of unknowingly,
widely communicated false speech,231 even in the presence of these unique harms,
the noncommercial expression will be protected.232 Therefore, under the equivalency
principle, unknowingly false, widely communicated commercial speech should be
protected, even when it gives rise to similarly unique harms.
In contrast, knowingly false but non-defamatory speech uttered in the course of
political debate is, as a categorical matter, usually assumed not to give rise to suf-
ficient harm to exclude that speech from the scope of First Amendment protection.233
This is so, even though the voters might be deceived and as a result cast their votes
in ways in which they would not have done had they known the truth.234 Such
generic “political” harm is apparently deemed to be so diffuse and its individual harm
so diluted that it is deemed not to rise to the level required to exclude even know-
ingly false speech from the scope of First Amendment protection.
One might well debate the wisdom of this view. Stealing a citizen’s vote could
arguably be deemed as harmful as stealing a citizen’s money. But we are willing to
accept it, if only for purposes of argument. As for knowingly false expression causing
interpersonal harm, we suppose the level of protection turns on the nature of that harm.
Speech tricking another into having sexual relations on the basis of knowingly false
representations, we assume, would not receive protection, even though the speech
is of course not motivated by the desire for commercial profit. The Court in Alvarez,
on the other hand, seemed to assume that at least some knowingly false speech
causes no harm at all.235 While we frankly doubt the accuracy of this conclusion,236
we accept it for purposes of our taxonomy.
In the context of noncommercial speech, then, protection for knowingly or reck-
lessly false expression turns entirely on the categorical nature of the harm caused.
231 Recall, however, that in the case of one-on-one communication between a professional
and an individual in the course of a professional fiduciary relationship, common sense dictates
that the First Amendment’s role must be far more limited. See supra note 196.
232 This is certainly true of unknowingly false defamatory speech of public figures, pursuant
to the New York Times Co. actual malice test. See supra notes 162–65 and accompanying text.
233 See State ex rel. Pub. Disclosure Comm’n v. 119 Vote No! Comm., 957 P.2d 691, 697–99
(Wash. 1998).
234 Id.
235 See supra Section II.B.
236 See supra Section II.B.
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Under the equivalency principle, protection for knowingly or recklessly false commer-
cial speech should turn on the exact same criteria. It would not follow, however, that
the end result would be that knowingly false commercial speech is protected as often
as knowingly false noncommercial speech is protected. That is simply because the
harm caused by knowingly false commercial speech will generally fall under the
heading of financial harm, health or safety harm, or both. And those harms are categori-
cally (and reasonably) considered more serious than the far more diffuse “political”
harm caused by the protected category of knowingly false noncommercial speech.
We must emphasize that we are not urging that false commercial speech receive
identical treatment to that received by false noncommercial speech. We are urging,
rather, that under the persuasive logic of the equivalency principle—the guiding di-
rective the Court seems to have adopted and applied in the case of truthful commercial
speech—false commercial speech be evaluated by the same standard that knowingly
false noncommercial speech is measured: Protection turns on the nature and degree
of the harm to which the speech gives rise. But because most knowingly false commer-
cial speech will usually give rise to either direct financial, safety, or health harms,
it is highly likely that even under the equivalency principle, more knowingly false
commercial speech will be suppressed than knowingly false noncommercial speech.
IV. THE PROBLEM OF MISLEADING SPEECH
To this point, our analysis has focused on the question of how knowingly false
commercial speech is to be treated for First Amendment purposes. We have con-
cluded that it is generally to be denied constitutional protection, even though at least
some knowingly false noncommercial speech is protected, not because it is less
valuable for First Amendment purposes, but solely because of the categorically more
severe nature of the harm generally caused by knowingly false commercial speech.237
We have purposely chosen not to consider the issue of how falsity is defined, because
under the equivalency principle we are demanding only “most favored nation status”
for commercial speech. In other words, when, and only when, noncommercial speech
would be characterized as false may commercial speech be characterized as false. For
present purposes, we are therefore agnostic to the definition of falsity. To this point,
however, our analysis has omitted a particularly thorny problem: the issue of First
Amendment protection for commercial speech that is not technically false, but can
be properly characterized as misleading. In many ways, technically true but mislead-
ing speech can be thought to cause financial or health/safety harms equivalent to
those caused by directly false statements (though, as the Supreme Court has demon-
strated, the harms caused by misleading speech are more easily curable than are
those caused by directly false statements, by the use of required disclaimers).238
237 See supra Part III.
238 Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S.
626, 651 (1985).
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At first blush, it may appear that because of our adherence to the equivalency
principle we are placed in a dilemma: Either we abandon the equivalency principle
and allow misleading commercial speech to be regulated, we adhere to the equiva-
lency principle and protect truthful but misleading commercial speech resulting in
significant societal harm, or we cause the very dilution whose existence we have
denied239 by imposing sweeping restrictions on the manner in which public debate
is normally conducted. More careful analysis, however, reveals that no such di-
lemma exists. Once we recall the harm-centric approach to the regulation of false
speech,240 it is relatively easy to distinguish the regulation of misleading commercial
speech from that of misleading noncommercial speech. Recall that most false or
misleading noncommercial speech will not give rise to either direct financial or safety/
health harms.241 To the extent such speech does in fact give rise to such harms, we
see no constitutional basis for denying government power to regulate misleading speech
through required use of disclaimers, just as is done in the case of commercial speech.
There is one conceivable role the First Amendment should potentially play in
the context of the regulation of misleading speech. The mere fact that speech—
commercial or noncommercial—gives only one side of a debate should not permit
government to deem that speech misleading and therefore regulable by means of
either suppression or required use of disclaimers. The First Amendment protects
advocacy,242 and commercial advertisers, like speakers generally, are permitted to
advocate on behalf of their views and beliefs. To be sure, when an advertised
product is found to give rise to potentially significant health risks that may well in-
fluence a reasonable person’s decision whether to use the product, under the taxon-
omy of categorical harms we propose that government should be permitted to require
those disclosures, even if the speech absent those disclosures cannot properly be
characterized as misleading. But once again, this is not because the speech is commer-
cial, but because it gives rise to the proximate danger of significant threats to health
and safety. We submit that even noncommercial speech found likely to be viewed
by roughly the same group of listeners as commercial speech making the identical
claims on behalf of the product in question should logically be subjected to an identical
level of regulation as the commercial speech is.243 We deem this not to be a form of
dilution, but rather simply tempering the First Amendment inquiry with principled
analysis and common sense.
239 See supra Section I.C.
240 See supra Part III.
241 See supra Part III.
242 See generally REDISH, supra note 135, at 89–90.
243 We qualify this First Amendment standard, for both commercial and noncommercial
speech, by emphasizing that we refer to required disclaimers only for undisputed dangers.
When the speaker—again, commercial or noncommercial—reasonably disputes the existence
of such dangers, the required disclaimers become a form of forced expression inconsistent
with the First Amendment.
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CONCLUSION
The idea that false commercial speech is deserving of any level of First Amend-
ment protection will no doubt shock scholars and jurists alike. Mere intuition, if
nothing else, should tell us that false commercial speech automatically falls outside
the First Amendment’s scope. This is so, even if truthful commercial speech does
not. Indeed, the Supreme Court has proceeded on just this notion since the beginning
of its commercial speech doctrine.244 But as one of us has previously argued, in-
tuition is not always the best way to shape First Amendment doctrine.245 The irony
of reliance on right-brained intuitionism to categorically reject First Amendment
protection for false commercial speech resembles the kind of knee-jerk, summary
dismissal of protection for truthful commercial speech many years ago.246 We would
like to think that First Amendment thought has come a long way since those days.247
We are hopeful that our analysis of false commercial speech and the equivalency
principle will at some point in the near future similarly be able to overcome the kind
of emotive shock that scholars will no doubt have in response to our proposal.
244 See supra Section I.A.
245 See generally Martin H. Redish, Commercial Speech, First Amendment Intuitionism
and the Twilight Zone of Viewpoint Discrimination, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 67 (2007).
246 See, e.g., Thomas H. Jackson & John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Commercial Speech: Economic
Due Process and the First Amendment, 65 VA. L. REV. 1, 14 (1979) (arguing that “[w]hatever
else it may mean, the concept of a first amendment right of personal autonomy in matters of be-
lief and expression stops short of a seller hawking his wares”). As one of us has written about
Jackson’s and Jeffries’ argument, “[t]his statement effectively replaces reason with rhetoric.”
REDISH, supra note 135, at 67.
247 See supra Section I.A.3.
